The everyday experiences of illness draw our attention to the importance of the cosmopolitics of care in which 'normal/ized' practices of care can neither be taking for granted nor be expected. Drawing on ethnographies of illness this paper argues that caring relations demand the attentiveness to the emerging requirements of care in concrete situations. Shared policy rules are beneficial if they allow to respond adequately to the unfolding issues, requirements and obligations of care practices. An ethnographic sense of and for caring practices may offer important insights to contribute to health care policy making processes.
Introduction
The everyday experiences of illness draw our attention to the importance of the cosmopolitics of care in which 'normal/ized' practices of care can neither be taking for granted nor be expected.
1 Drawing on ethnographies of illness this paper argues that caring relations demand the attentiveness to the emerging requirements of care in concrete situations. Shared policy rules are beneficial if they allow to respond adequately to the unfolding issues, requirements and obligations of care practices. An ethnographic sense of and for caring practices may offer important insights to 1 On the notion of ‚cosmopolitics' as explored here, see Schillmeier (2013 Schillmeier ( , 2014 and Stengers (2005, contribute to health care policy making processes which aim to avoid the fallacy of mistaking the abstract for the concrete issues of situated care practices.
Caring practices easily unfold the bifurcation of care: those who care and those who need care. The history of the Western Judea-Christian tradition of policing care (as well as the medical gaze) undoubtedly contributed -wittingly or not -to the bifurcation of care, rendering those in need of care as victims of bad fate, as dependent, passive, lacking autonomy, choice and discretion, suffering from an 'ill' situation that is beyond what is considered as 'normal' and thus 'healthy' (Foucault, 2009; Schillmeier, 2014) . The history of policing care then is also the history of di/visioning the normal from the pathological, health from illness, ability from disability and configuring thereby the historical multiplicity of the societal other and his/her 'troublesome' life-worlds (cf. Borsay, 2005) .
Care studies critically assess the bifurcation of care by addressing the specificities of caring relations in situ (cf. Barnes et al., 2015; Latimer, 2000; Mol, 2008; Mol, Moser and Pols, 2010) . These studies highlight that care is not generally divided between carers and those cared for, but distributed between the different actors involved. This includes the person experiencing illness or disability as central agents of care (Schillmeier, 2014) . As Mol's 'logic of care ' (Mol, 2008) 2 argues, caring practices extend the agencies of care to the non-human. Accordingly, it would appear similarily problematic to bifurcate between care as the emotional warmth of humanness and 2 Mol contrasts the logic of care with the logic of choice. With Mol I share some uneasiness with the current discourse of ‚patient choice'. On patient choice as part of health care policy advocating the idea of ‚personalized medicine', see Schillmeier (2017) .
the cold, rationalizing technology that is prone to endanger and contradict the requirements and practices of care. As ethnographic care studies highlight, technology plays a crucial, but nevertheless ambiguous, role in everyday care practices (cf. Schillmeier, 2014; Mol, Moser and Pols, 2010) . As a collective achievement of affective, embodied and material relations between humans as well as humans and non-humans, care refers to practices of attention given to an unfolding relational situation of requirements and obligations that need to be addressed in situ to live well with and in it.
Current issues of health care policies in ageing societies pose novel and demanding questions concerning the affordability and the limits of institutionalized forms of care (Harper and Hamblin, 2016; Lloyd, 2012; Milligan, 2009; Schillmeier and Domenèch, 2010; Weicht, 2015) . Social change has proven to be a source for controversies by which the different understandings of what counts as 'good care', and what is necessary for it and what can be expected from specific 'matters of care' (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011), becomes visible. Caring relations about health are exposed to and affected by the demands, possibilities and restrictions of the national or organisational budget, the dependency on different forms of (political) governance and their transformations, the impact of techno-scientific development, juridical questions, issues of management, organisational obstacles and institutionalised procedures, religious views, the outlook of professional training for carers, the effects of cultural differences and so on. Reflecting these changes, the policing of care mirrors wider socio-cultural and political realities, which contribute to the need or dismissal of care, the conditions of possibility of how care is conducted, who is involved in the process of care, how care is valued and how caring relations are understood and assessed (Barnes et al., 2015) .
These multifactorial societal dependencies and changes may not only have improving effects on care practices, but quite often fall foul with or even put at risk the requirements and obligations of the caring relations in situ and harm its vulnerable actors -inside and outside of institutionalised forms of health care (Bartlett, 1999; Francis, 2013) . Ethnographies of care have shown that neo-liberal economies of care are frequently at odds with attentiveness, flexibility, patience, empathy, skilful engagement, time demanding practices needed to address the specific and changing requirements of everyday practices of care (Heinlein, 2003; Latimer, 2000; Schweiger, 2011) . The neo-liberal economy evokes a clash between the demands of situated care practices and (the promises and regulations of) economically driven health care policies.
Care relations often become the locus of the enactment of these discrepancies. To name a persistent concern in health care practices: Next to many other issues, the lack of time to engage sensibly with emerging situations in the conduct of everyday care practices names a long-standing, significant and often unsolvable problem for neoliberal health care systems. As Schweiger has put it: Carers do have patience, but do not have the time for it. She shows that the lack for caring time became most apparent when the institutional settings of care practices (of a specific ward in Germany) changed from being governed by a Judea-Christian regime of care committed to the 'grace of charity' towards a more business-oriented model of care. With the latter, the patient turned into a customer/client of a profit-oriented health care economy delivering calculated care packages (cf. Tritter et al., 2010) . All too often, pre-given formats of how much care should be delivered and how much time can be afforded to do so, limit the time for the emergent requirements of care situations which frequently render generalized economies of quality assessment problematic and in need of re-assessment in the concrete situation (Schweiger, 2011) .
For the caring relationship, this conflict -of having patience without the time to realize it in situations that would require so -recurrently creates stress for the carers and those cared for, provokes moral dilemmas and evokes rather uncaring situations.
Situated care often requires flexible engagement to the shifting requirements of care that demand patience and time to provide and experience good care. What becomes apparent in emerging situations of care practices as well as in ongoing attempts to revise care policies, is the power of an occurring problematic situation which can't be solved along mere means of standardised practices. When we care, we are concerned about the possibilities of care, we hesitate, we struggle, we tinker, we pause, we concentrate, we mobilize and aim at skilful action. When we care, we are moved by a social problem enacted by the embodied eventfulness of everyday practices. 'Care', as I put it elsewhere, 'as a social matter of concern preserves the possibilities of difference as an on-going collective achievement' (Schillmeier, 2014: 102 
Cosmopolitical Events and Precarious Selves
This is the story of Mr B who has been suffering from two strokes. 4 After the second stroke Mr B decided to move into a caring home whereas his wife remained in their apartment (Schillmeier, 2014) . Mr B's decision to move into a nursing home, so he told us 5 , became necessary since he saw himself turning into a burden for his wife who suffered from a slipped disk when helping him out of bed. This was a significant issue 4 Mr B played an important role in Schillmeier (2014) . In the latter, I was trying to develop a cosmopolitical understanding of experiencing illness. In this chapter, I will briefly re-narrate the story of Mr B by focussing solely on the question of situated care. (Schillmeier, 2014 ). An event like a stroke unfolds a cosmopolitical situation:
affected by a stroke bodies experience an unexpected, emerging and disruptive situation for which novel caring practices are required. It requires a process of attentive engagement with a demanding situation that may involve many ups and downs, unexpected everyday life restrictions, disciplining bodies, enrolling others (humans, institutions, technologies), learning to do things anew, to give up (doing) certain things and so on.
Caring rarely is a smooth empirical process. What we have seen so far is that care and its requirements are not only shifting, unpredictable and situational, but care is also biographical and enacts the different modes of caring in highly idiosyncratic ways.
Care creates novel interactions and in/dependencies. Caring practices are embodied, material and spatially situated as well as they re-assemble the past, present and its possible futures. Mr B's biography of care -be it self-care and the care for him and others -names a collective accomplishment, a social process of psychological, physical and emotional learning that re-relates bodies, materials and technologies, ideas, affects and feelings. With the advent of cosmopolitical events like a stroke, the pragmatics of caring relations change significantly --within and/or between bodies and their environments. Bodies and minds become affected by, relate, interact with and become dependent on others in different ways than they are used to be. Stroked bodies often suffer, become less mobile and agile, are in pain, become 'unreliable' or become a concern in the way one cares about them and how one can care for others.
Depending of the effects of event, stroked bodies 'seem to be or become [more or less, MS] unknowing' (Latimer 2009: 4) .
To look at caring relations as shifting and situated reveals that caring about one's body is to learn to have a body through embodied and material relations in multiple ways.
As Latour (2004: 2) reminds us: 'to have a body is to learn to be affected, meaning "effectuated", moved, put into motion by other entities, humans or nonhumans. If you are not engaged in this learning you become insensitive, dumb, you drop dead'.
Caring trajectories reveal indeed, as Spinoza suggested, that we don't know what a body is capable of (cf. Deleuze 1992: Ch. 14). It may be good or bad. Good care in practice, though, aims at keeping and strengthening the situated possibilities of wellbeing, it's health as it were, rather than diminishing or endangering these possibilities.
This is important, since precarious selves express the vulnerability and fragility of caring relations that require a shift towards (often) unacquainted forms of care.
Precarious selves should not only be understood as in need of human help and/or medical and technological assistance. Rather, precarious selves become cosmopolitical actors as well (Schillmeier, 2014) : They demand a changing relation of care, practices and environments (inner and outer) to meet the requirements and to live well with it. As cosmopolitical actors, precarious selves question, disrupt and alter the common, normal and taken-for-granted -be it biographical, physical, mental, institutional as well as their diverse interlinking. As cosmopolitical agents, precarious selves bring to the fore the question of care and address the differences and limits of how care was experienced and practiced so far. Cosmopolitical actors unfold a learning situation for all the actors involved and require the ars inveniendi of care that is attentive to the relational demands and obligations. Mrs M seen, yes … but not so intensely.
Caring with Precarious Technologies
Mrs M, who often forgets that she is in nursing home, frequently feels 'out of place'
and realizes that the whole situation doesn't feel right. Mrs M is agitated, nervous and 'all over the place' when she is not able to connect with her body and environment in a meaningful way. She feels lost and is concerned about all the messy [schweinigen] situations. Mrs M is not only concerned with the nursing home and how they do things. Experiencing these dementing moments, it worries her that the 'whole' situation makes her so uneasy. In the dementing situation, she feels lost in between strange practices, oddly behaving people and uncanny things of an intensively felt everyday life. Affected by these 'demented' others and things her existence is felt as deeply troubled.
Mrs M goes in and out of these dementing moments. Sometimes she is rather happy with herself and her environment, she remembers things, tells stories about her family, she wants to see her old home, she enjoys talking about flowers, which have been her professional passion for many years. In other situations, bodies and things are mixed up and often her relations of knowing and being familiar with are lost. Her anxiety brings to the fore that being with others -human and nonhuman alike -has no subjective meaning for her and she feels that she has no capabilities to do anything to change the uncanny situation. She feels distressed, depressed and lost when the situation remains messy, full of unknowing people, things and unfamiliar practices.
Quite often she feels that the environment turns alien and she feels utterly isolated, trapped and moved around by the environment. Frequently, Mrs M feels left on her own and at the mercy of an oppressive environment. Confronted with a multitude of faits acccomplis (Schillmeier, 2014: 82pp) Mrs M feels that she has no possibilities to engage with and to learn to be affected by her environment in positive ways. Rather, the very stubbornness of these accomplished matters of facts make her feel living in an iron cage, trapped, a puppet of and for others. She can't contribute, can't participate, can't learn from and orient herself along them.
As Mrs M made clear, she has seen similar 'things' before, but 'not so intensely'.
Although intensely felt she cannot positively relate to her environment. When she feels anxious, her relations with the world are not only 'massive and vague' (Whitehead 1978) , but she is driven by negatively felt affective relations that do not contribute to the concrescence of meaningful bodies and things. And yes: Mrs M feels unable to care for the situation in the way she wishes to.
Throughout the dementing situation, Mrs M's world is uncannily present. The sheer presence of bodies and things is negatively felt and keeps bodies and things apart:
Bodies and things remain fully present, but don't protract in time and appear as isolated and rather strange beings: coercive, unknown, scary, uncanny, undisclosed What is absent is a referential situation, an oikos, i.e. an eco-logical process that enables bodies and things to be/come, to be and change, i.e. to be able to be affected in mutual ways. Mrs M shows her awareness and concern for the missing learning process. Indeed, it would be problematic to argue that Mrs M does not engage in selfcare. Quite on the contrary, it is her questioning, her constant tinkering with words that expresses one of her remaining possibilities to positively assemble with humans (and non-humans). With words, she tries to re-gain a caring situation in which she would be able to animate her life and her environment, i.e. to make them part of a living situation through which she and her environment gain meaningful relations.
The expression of her bodily feelings, her anxieties and her constant questioning, her experimenting with words are existential modes of self-care which are enacted by and engage with the specificity of a situation which is 1) experienced as massive and vague,
and 2) alludes to the questionability of the general, the whole of the situation. It is the dementing moment, which affects the erasure of the specificities of Mrs M's life and unfolds the questionability of the general. Massive and vague, everything -humans, non-humans, practices, perceptions -becomes a source of uncertainty and concern due to their 'stubbornness' to refuse becoming part of a caring situation. Without a caring situation, the very subjectivity of bodies and things miss their soul, they appear nameless since they lack their thread of life, their caring biography, their constituting world, their positive subjective feelings, their possibilities. The philosopher A.N.
Whitehead writes on the importance of the soul and personal identity:
[I]n conceiving our personal identity we are apt to emphasize rather the soul than the body. The one individual is that coordinated stream of personal experiences, which is my thread of life or your thread of life. It is that succession of self-realization, each occasion with its direct memory of its past and with its anticipation of the future. That claim to enduring self-identity is our self-assertion of personal identity. (…) The 'external world (…) experienced, is the basic fact within those experiences. All the emotions, and purposes, and enjoyments, proper to the individual existence of the soul are nothing other than the soul's reactions to this experienced world which lies at the base of the soul's existence. Thus, (…) the experienced world is one complex factor in the composition of many factors constituting the essence of the soul. We can phrase this shortly by saying that in one sense the world is in the soul. (Whitehead, 1968: 161pp) Thus, through Mrs M's dementing moments and how she engages with them brings to the fore the soul's existence as embodied matters of care. The dementing moment make us aware of the importance of 1) our bodily existence, 2) our relations with other bodies and things, and 3) our temporal being in the way it gives significance to the mediation of the past, present and future. It makes us aware that having a soul refers Mrs M's dementing situation brings to the fore the highly problematic ontic as well as ontological status of merely present 'matters of fact' as highly distressing and questionable, all too fixed, fully present but 'time-scanty' entities which indeed appear as soulless. But, to be sure, the point is also that Mrs M's 'self-care' is not fully erased by these soulless matters of fact. Quite on the contrary, they gain importance in the way they turn into matters of concern that trouble Mrs M's world. And these matters of concern are translated into matters of care through the ways Mrs M engages language to address the questionability of these matters. To be in language unfolds a very specific mode of existence that achieves togetherness, which may prove to become a way of re-member-ing with her body and her environment. As one mode of caring, dwelling in between the meaningfulness of words, the use of language gains foremost importance in Mrs M's life to possibly re-associate with other modes of concern, belonging and caring (e.g. being in soulful relations with humans and things). All the attempts of the member of staff to repeat a situation in/through which Mrs M would be able to interact with and re-assemble her past (as a florist) dramatically failed. The idea to engage in a caring relation proved impossible. On one hand, Mrs M, we may say, resisted complying with a sheer repetitive act. She had no concern for the member of staff and his caring attempts. On the other, one may also argue that the member of staff didn't give much attention to Mrs M mood and the sensitive and precarious situation she was in. One may say that he acted rather careless and Mrs M disliked his way of 'superficial' engagement. Having said this, the member of staff may also be acquainted with a situation like this and may had expected that Mrs M may change her mind and will contribute to his caring ambitions. The situation, however, had a quite dramatic ending with Mrs M asking the member of staff to leave the room.
Repetition, Care and its Failures
Mrs M was not in the mood at all for being mobilized to care for the other's caring efforts. Quite on the contrary, it seems that Mrs M was bugged by the (stubborn) attempt of the member of staff to make her do things she didn't feel like doing. Mrs M didn't feel to engage in a staged situation that is not hers, to make her smell flowers which do not smell, to listen to his idle talk to make her become the florist again, and so forth. It seems that Mrs M feels that she is unable to care about flowers in the way the member of staff wishes for. She was asked to be creative, to use her florist hands and thus to engage in meaning-and skilful bouquet tying practices. To hand-tie flowers wasn't of her concern, in the situation flowers appear as mere matter of facts, purely 'flower facts', some yellow, some not, some smell and some don't, some have a name and some are just flowers, and many flowers become one flower. All in all, just normal flowers but no mediators of care as suggested by the member of staff. To care well means to look after the process of differing and only through being with others -human non-human alike -differences gain a hold, i.e. make a difference. It is precisely the unruly and often unacquainted processes of how differences occur which unfold the time-spaces of care, time-spaces of learning to get affected by the process of embodied differentiation. It is the cosmopolitics of situated care and its requirements that address the questionability of normalized and normalizing embodied and material relations. Paraphrasing A.N. Whitehead (1968) 
